THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993
COPYRIGHT Council on Foreign Relations Inc. 1994
THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT
World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated
to proliferate visions of what it will be--the end of history, the return of
traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state
from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of
these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a
crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the
coming years.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation
states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The
fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of
conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of
the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of
the Western world were largely among princes--emperors, absolute monarchs and
constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies,
their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they
ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French
Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than
princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars
of peoples had begun." This nineteenth- century pattern lasted until the end of
World War 1. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction
against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first
among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between
communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict
became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which
was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its
identity in terms of its ideology.
These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily
conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has
labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and
the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With
the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase,
and its center- piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western
civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of
civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no
longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join
the West as movers and shapers of history.
THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS
During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third
Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to
group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms
of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and
civilization.
What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural
entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all
have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The
culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village
in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that
distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will
share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities.
Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural
entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people
have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined
both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs,
institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have
levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees
of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a
Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of
identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine
their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of
civilizations change.
Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a
civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small
number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include
several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab
civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization.
Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations.
Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and
Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless
meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are
real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And,
as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the
sands of time.
Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global
affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader
reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of
History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them
exist in the contemporary world.
WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH
Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the
world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight
major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most
important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines
separating these civilizations from one another.
Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic.
Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,
tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations
have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and
the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as
well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and
responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These
differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are
far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political
regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not
necessarily, mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among
civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent
conflicts.
Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between
peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions
intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between
civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration
to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased
receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react
far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from
Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out,
"An Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern
region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian.
In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different
civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn,
invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back
deep into history.
Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout
the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also
weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion
has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled
"fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism,
Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions
the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated,
middle- class technicians, professionals and business persons. The
"unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the
dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of
religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis
for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites
civilizations.
Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role
of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time,
however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring
among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends
toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy
and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and
nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate
over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at
the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the
will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.
In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who
were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or
Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the
populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the
indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A
de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western
countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and
habits become more popular among the mass of the people.
Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence
less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the
former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor
and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become
Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side
are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In
conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given
that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the
Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even
more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among
people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a
citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and
half-Muslim.
Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade
that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent
in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent
in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to
continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic
regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand,
economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common
civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European
culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade
Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American
cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable
economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique
to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with
other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries
inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like
that in Europe and North America.
Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of
the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries.
With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological
differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural
commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian
economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in
fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,
"Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based
economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce
and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and
manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and
services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network Singapore), a
tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of
land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from
Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network--often based on extensions of
the traditional clans--has been described as the backbone of the East Asian
economy."(1)
Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation
Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan,
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this
organization, founded originally in the 1960 by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is
the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no
chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central
American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts
to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the
Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.
As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are
likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and
people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined
states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic
identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and
religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to
immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity
gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most
important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and
liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to
advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other
civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the
basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize
support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.
The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro- level,
adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often
violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level,
states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic
power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third
parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious
values.
THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS
The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and
ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and
bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically
and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the
ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe
between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and
Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in
Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of
Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the
boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia,
cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine
from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the
rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line
now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans
this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg
and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are
Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European
history--feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the
French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically
better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to
increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of
democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are
Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires
and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they
are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop
stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced
the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As
the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also
at times a line of bloody conflict.
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has
been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish
surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the
thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring
Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the
seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway
over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid
siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman
power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most
of North Africa and the Middle East.
After World War 11, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires
disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested
themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for
its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they
wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created
by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the
1950; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into
Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked
Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic
terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the
weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized
Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990,
when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some
Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is
increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern
tier."
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is
unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs
feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West.
It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military
presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and
their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in
addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social
development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and
efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political
systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings
have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy
strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but
it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.
Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular
population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to
increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward
minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with
respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is
increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish
migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.
On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash
of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an
Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is
in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the
struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar
conclusion:
We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and
policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of
civilizations--the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient
rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the
worldwide expansion of both.(2)
Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic
civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian
black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the
image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the
on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad
between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between
Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political
conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians
in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are
likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic
of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in
Khartoum in February I993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist
government against the Christian minority there.
On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between
Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the
simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations between
Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and
Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the
tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment
of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Religion reinforces the revital of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian
fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well
captured by Archie Roosevelt:
Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the
Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the
Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long
confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not
only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities
today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has
preoccupied Russians through the centuries.(3)
The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The
historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now
not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying
religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and
India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in
December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a
secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has
outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a
ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an
increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold
War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have
reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons
proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war,"
Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and
America.
The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations
between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates
economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least
on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic
values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more
different. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less
serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the
same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between
American culture and European culture are so much less than those between
American civilization and Japanese civilization.
The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which
they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly
predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and
between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the
proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic
cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most
violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the
great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is
particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of
nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between
Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel,
Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has
bloody borders.
CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME
Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war
with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from
other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves,
civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country"
syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power
considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be
seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the
Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations,
but each involved some elements of civilizational rallying, which seemed to
become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a
foretaste of the future.
First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a
coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments
overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him on, and
he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic
fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the
Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab
nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his
supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations. "It is
not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the
Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is the
West against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief
Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against
the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies
will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr."
"This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all
Muslims and not against Iraq alone."
The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam
Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate
their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or
distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq,
including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of
Iraq in january I993. The Western- Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of
1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against
Iraq.
Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to
protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating
U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double standard. A world
of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards:
people apply one standard to their kin- countries and a different standard to
others.
Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former
Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and I993 stimulated Turkey to
become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren
in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the
Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our
newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are
still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia
that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Ozal agreed,
remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit."
Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkish Air Force
jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended
food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they
would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its
existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was
dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however,
political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on
the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of
turning 180 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.
Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics
manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they
suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed,
however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in
an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other II
members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and
Croatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to
the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the
Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading
actors in Western civilization rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently
Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central
European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other
hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the
Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and
nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government
for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993
several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and
reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.
Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for
not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from
all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo,
Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese
groups sent guerriuas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In I993 uP to
4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting
in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under
increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide
more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had
reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the
Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-a-vis
the Serbs.
In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that
politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav
conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and
Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against
fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died
there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."
Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the
same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and
less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in
a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might
otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of
violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea,
the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is
what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians
should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had
close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all
the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively
negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has
been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox
Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between
Russians and Ukrainians.
Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and
it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the
Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and
the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines.
Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potent
means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the
coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will
be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between
civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between
civilizations.
THE WEST VERSUS THE REST
The west in now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other
civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military
conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is
unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates
international political and security institutions and with Japan international
economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively
settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world
economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of
which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion
of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security
Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the
West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world
community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic
collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to
actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western
powers.(4) Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the
West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic
policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF
undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get
an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would
agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks
who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien
rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."
Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered
only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's
use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's
sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the
quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting
the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing
suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the
largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the
Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military
power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western
predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and
economic values.
That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there
is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and
struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of
conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that
is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has
argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all
men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the
rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ
fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty,
the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state,
often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or
Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a
reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous
values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the
younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be
a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the
particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes
one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative
studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are
most important in the West are least important worldwide."(5) In the political
realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the
United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western
ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government
originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has
usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.
The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore
Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the
responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.(6) Those
responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme,
non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course
of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by
the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated
global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states
have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-
wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and
accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to
"balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating
with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous
values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.
THE TORN COUNTRIES
In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries
with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries
have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their
society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their
leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their
countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their
countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is
Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the
Attaturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation
state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they
applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however,
elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued
that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the
elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West
refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey will not become a member of the
European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we are
Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca,
and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the
answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the
leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the
borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making
strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.
During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that
of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and
attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition
to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and
to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in
the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamental
economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In
1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length to
me all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I
remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to
change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He
looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are
trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark
indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the
redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders
have to make gestures to Islam (Ozal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's
North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico
to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).
Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United
States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important
torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of the West or
the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one
in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia,
which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then
challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism
shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With
communism discredited Russians once again face that question.
President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to
make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian
elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderate
dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist"
course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world
economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the
Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the
two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an
exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless argues that Russia should
give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its
Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our
resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the
eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for
subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian
military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia,
and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian
people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr
Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian
civilization.(7) More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist,
anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military
strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The
people of Russia are as divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European
Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive
attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been
for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country.
To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three
requirements. First, its political and economic elite has to be generally
supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be
willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the
recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three
requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large
part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with
respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and
Marxism- Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences,
ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A
traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals.
A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist.
It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian
traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject
liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the
relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and
conflictual.(8)
THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION
The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably.
They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater
for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater
for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a
unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West
in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those
countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join
the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and
political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by
cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this
cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge
Western interests, values and power.
Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military
power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and
several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their
military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western
and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries.
One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon
States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the
redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal.
During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a
stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet
Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms
control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military
capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this
through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer
of arms and weapons technologies.
The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses
largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the
guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that
goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and
nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It
also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of
sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The
attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or
potentially hostile to the West.
The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and
to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also
have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense
minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Don't fight the
United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical
weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential
equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already has
nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them. A
top Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear
weapons, and in 1988 the president of Iran reportedly issued a directive calling
for development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and
radiological weapons."
Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities
is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create
military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly
increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the
modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former
Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a
one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities,
acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft
carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South China
Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is also
a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to
Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas.
It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and
production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials
believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped
components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear
weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and
missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology
is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement
in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.
A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to
promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies
needed to counter the military power of the West. It may or may not last. At
present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support
pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms
competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In
an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to
achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms
competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting
not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same
time reducing its own military capabilities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all
other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will
become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization
will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the
hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important;
civilization- consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will
supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of
conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western
civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which
non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful
political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to
develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups
in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more
violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent
conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most
dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount
axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest";
the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries
part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this;
a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West
and several Islamic- Confucian states.
This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations.
It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If
these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their
implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between
short-term advantage and long- term accommodation. In the short term it is
clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity
within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North
American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe
and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and
maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of
local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit
the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to
moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military
superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts
among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups
sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international
institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to
promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.
In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization
is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become
modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this
quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth,
technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They
will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and
values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase.
Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern
civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and
interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the
West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its
interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the
West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and
philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which
people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to
identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For
the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a
world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist
with the others.
Dear AP World student: thanks for reading this far.
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